

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 January 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 666th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and the first part of the 1994 session.

It is an honour for me to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of France at the start of this session. I shall spare no effort to serve the interests of the Conference. I will ensure that each and everybody's position is respected. I shall need the cooperation of everybody.

I welcome the presence of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky for the first time as Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We are convinced that he will be able to place his wealth of experience at the service of the Conference. He, and we with him, will be fortunate in being able to rely on the great competence and wholehearted devotion of the new Deputy Secretary-General, our friend Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. A special thought goes to Ambassador Vincente Berasategui, who discharged his duties as Secretary-General of the Conference with very great distinction.

I am glad to welcome the Director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, who will be addressing us during this meeting.

I would like to welcome the new colleagues who have taken up their posts as representatives to the Conference - Mr. Ibrahim Omar of Ethiopia, Mr. Meghlaoui of Algeria, Mr. Tarre Murzi of Venezuela, Mr. Vattani of Italy and Mr. Sánchez Arnau of Argentina. I extend our best wishes to them and assure them of our full cooperation. Lastly, I would like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, for the exemplary way in which he carried out his functions, and to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, who as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban successfully conducted the consultations entrusted to him.

Those who, just a year ago, were worried about the future of the Conference on Disarmament were indeed mistaken. Following the conclusion of the Convention banning chemical weapons, the Conference embarked on its own reform. For the first time it started a substantive debate on transparency in armaments. In particular, for the first time since nuclear weapons appeared, it decided to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and soon, perhaps, a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Thus we see the proof that the Conference both reflects the international situation and acts as the instrument of the will of the international community. The cold war had halted its operations. The end of the East-West confrontation has cleared the log-jam in its work. However, it is not enough just to look on as progress is made. We must also be actively involved in change. Here I believe we have a twofold obligation. First of all to complete without delay work to expand the membership of the Conference. How can we justify the Conference's remaining a prisoner of outdated ideological formats now that international balances have undergone such profound change? Who can deny the need to include new States whose military

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capabilities and strategic roles correspond to today's concerns in the field of arms control and non-proliferation? We must reach agreement without delay on a new make-up for the Conference which will guarantee its representative nature and thus its legitimacy. It is my intention to appoint a new special coordinator to propose a rapid solution to this urgent question.

It is no less important to bring our agenda up to date. At the beginning of last year's session we adopted a pragmatic work programme which in no way prejudged our individual positions. This approach proved useful. Wisdom should lead us to adopt the same formula this year. But we also need to address ourselves seriously to the adaptation of our agenda to present-day realities. Here too the appointment of a special coordinator to look at this matter therefore seems to me essential.

In setting its objectives, in its working methods, in its very spirit, the Conference is a reflection of current international events. If we keep to the facts, we cannot but note that the present-day strategic situation is sending contradictory signals. On the one hand, there are some very positive developments: the end of the East-West confrontation, which the European countries are the first to welcome, because it has allowed many of them to recover their freedom and the power to control their own destinies, and it has allowed all of them to rediscover the ties which have been woven in the course of a long-common history. The implementation of a real process of disarmament, the results of which are already impressive: the INF Treaty, the START I and II agreements, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Convention banning chemical weapons, the launching of negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty, an agreement to negotiate a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, faster progress is being made towards universality in the NPT. More than 15 States, including China and France, have recently acceded to the Treaty. Algeria and Argentina have just announced their intention to do so. Peace processes, in which the question of arms control plays a decisive role, have been initiated in several areas of tension: in Cambodia, and of course in the Middle East.

At the regional level, the conclusion of several agreements marking substantial progress in arms control. In Latin America, in Africa - where a denuclearization treaty is being drawn up - in south Asia, where confidence-building measures have been established between India and Pakistan.

On the other hand we cannot ignore the persistence and indeed the exacerbation of situations which threaten international security. Several serious conflicts have not yet been resolved, whether in Somalia, where United Nations intervention has not yet succeeded in restoring peace, Haiti, where democratic legitimacy has been flouted and violence continues, or Afghanistan, which is still torn by conflict - and of course the tragedy in Bosnia. At the same time, weapons are being built up in many regions of the world, particularly in Asia. Major nuclear capabilities remain, in Europe and throughout the world. It is particularly important not to ignore this since the stabilization of the former Soviet Union is still in doubt. Finally, in several regions there are continuing or worsening risks of proliferation of

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weapons of mass destruction: the discovery of the nuclear capabilities of Iraq, the potential consequences of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the refusal of North Korea to abide by its international commitments in the field of non-proliferation.

The recapitulation of these facts should prompt a number of reflections on the orientation of the work of the Conference, and indeed on the state of mind in which we must tackle our negotiations. First of all we must address ourselves seriously to the various items on our agenda. The question of security assurances to non-nuclear countries remains essential. Prerequisites exist to make it possible to harmonize the negative assurances already provided by the nuclear Powers. I do not think I am going too far if I say that there is room for progress on this important matter, which we have to consider in the light of both the end of the cold war and the new risks of proliferation.

The question of transparency in armaments is no less important. United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L gives the Conference on Disarmament a well-defined responsibility in expanding the Register on transfers of conventional arms and in extending the field of transparency to weapons of mass destruction and transfers of technology for military purposes. The Conference must therefore continue its efforts in order to make its own contribution.

Looking at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is time to move beyond the sterile confrontation of hard and fast positions. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, a shift towards the negotiation of confidence-building measures was noted in 1993. It is promising because it is realistic. Specific proposals were made last year. They should be taken into account in 1994.

The question of a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes will be on our agenda for the first time. As for nuclear tests, the clear aim of the convention is to help to combat nuclear-weapon proliferation. It is therefore essential for the future convention to be universal and internationally verifiable. That is why many delegations, including mine, believe that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for dealing with this subject. However, consensus does not exist on this point. We must therefore rapidly clarify this aspect of the problem. It is my intention to designate without delay a special coordinator whose task it will be to gather the views of member States and identify guidelines for our future work.

Finally, this session sees the beginning of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Obviously a lot is at stake in these negotiations. They are beginning on the basis of a number of essential elements contained in the decision adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993, in resolution 48/70, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly, and in the future mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. We believe that these elements are the following. First, the fact that the treaty will need to be universal. All the countries with a nuclear

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capability will therefore have to be parties to it. This is essential for the treaty's entry into force. It is difficult to imagine the acknowledged nuclear Powers agreeing to new constraints if other countries remain free to develop clandestine nuclear armament programmes.

Secondly, the need for international verification. The treaty will also have to be internationally verifiable. Who would agree to join an agreement whose provisions could be easily breached? Who would accept the constraints of verification if there were no guarantees that it would be dependable and impartial?

Lastly, the need for truly multilateral negotiations. This is a precondition for universality. All the countries which are to accept restrictions under the treaty must be involved from the very outset in drafting it. Hence, I repeat once again, the urgent need to expand the membership in the Conference.

If we really wish to make progress on these various subjects, if we really wish to shoulder our responsibilities in the new international situation, we must bear in mind a few basic considerations. The first is that international security henceforth involves efforts shared by everybody and can no longer be based on the responsibility of just a few. However convenient such an assertion might have been, it is difficult to show today that the only threat to peace lies in the nuclear weapons possessed by the five nuclear Powers. It is just as difficult to deny that the build-up of conventional weapons and the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in regions of tension, constitute a real danger, first and foremost for the great majority of developing countries which suffer both pressure from powerful neighbours and restrictions on transfers of technology which result from the very risks of proliferation. This leads me to a second, no less important truth: that there is a clear link between the results of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the disarmament effort. It is difficult to see how the disarmament process could continue in a context of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The third consideration is that it is essential to comply with commitments undertaken. A sovereign country takes on international commitments, particularly in the field of security, only if it is convinced that the treaty it is signing is in keeping with its interests. But at the same time it must have an assurance that everything will be done to ensure that the Commitments undertaken by all parties will be respected by all parties, and that failure to comply will be sanctioned. For example, what would be the use of the efforts we are making to give the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the universal character it deserves and to extend it in the best possible conditions, if at the same time it were to be shown that compliance with its provisions was not guaranteed? I am thinking in particular of North Korea: this case cannot, we feel, be viewed merely as a regional issue; because it has to do with respect for an international standard, it is of concern to all of us. Hence the new importance attached to verification regimes, as we can see in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The chemical weapons Convention and, soon, the

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nuclear-test-ban treaty or the convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. This leads us to a fourth and last fact: that a multilateral approach to disarmament and non-proliferation issues is increasingly indispensable. A rule of international security, if it is to be subscribed to by as many States as possible, if it is to be respected, has to be drawn up jointly and provide for collective means of implementation. The time is past when two super-Powers could negotiate a disarmament treaty between themselves and then submit it for endorsement by the international community. It is no affront to anyone to recognize this.

Each of us will have understood, in this recapitulation of a few truths, to what extent we view the Conference on Disarmament as being at the heart of these changes and these new approaches. Some had ventured to assert that, with the end of the cold war, disarmament was a thing of the past because it was supposed to be only an ideological instrument in the East-West confrontation. Events have given that idea the lie. The disarmament process has become a reality. In taking on substance, it has changed its nature and has become more rich in content: it covers weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons, it applies to the regional as well as the global level, it includes confidence-building measures as well as non-proliferation. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament has a strengthened role to play. Because of its specific status - its limited but representative membership, its position as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the rule of consensus on which its operations rest - it can make a major contribution to the creation of a safer world. Provided that we have the will to do so, this is within our grasp.

The consultations I have held on organizational matters lead me to believe that we can certainly embark on substantive work very soon. When we have heard the speakers on the list for today in plenary, I will invite the Conference to consider rapidly in an informal meeting the steps to take in order to make progress in our work. I intend in particular to deal with the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for this session; the question of the President's statement on the agenda and the organization of the session; and lastly consideration of requests for participation in our work from non-member States of the Conference. Immediately afterwards we will resume the plenary for an official confirmation of the agreement among members of the Conference on these three subjects. In the next few days, I will be continuing my consultations with members on other pending organizational matters.

I would now like to invite Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to read the message sent to us by the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to thank you for your kind and generous words of welcome, and I wish to assure you and the members of the Conference of my determination and that of my collaborators in the secretariat to do our utmost to assist in your important work.

I shall now read to the Conference the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"It gives me great pleasure to send this message to the participants in this Conference as it opens its 1994 session.

"In my report entitled 'New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era', I stated that the changed international environment had created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, while also posing new challenges. I also emphasized that the end of bipolarity had not diminished, but had rather increased, the need for disarmament. I said that the disarmament process should be seen as an integral part of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

"In my report to the General Assembly last year on the work of the Organization in 1993, I spoke of the significant events that had taken place in the international security environment, and which required new responses and renewed efforts by the international community. I stressed that the momentum created by the many positive breakthroughs of the past year needed to be maintained.

"I also pointed out that notable among such achievements was the decision of your Conference to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That decision had been made possible by the crucial commitment of nuclear-weapon States to such a treaty. It represented a culmination of the efforts of the international community as a whole to bring about the long-cherished goal of the total prohibition of nuclear testing.

"The recently concluded session of the General Assembly further confirmed this positive trend towards the consolidation of the pattern of cooperation among Members of the United Nations in the vital sphere of security, arms limitation and disarmament, as exemplified by the growing number of resolutions adopted by consensus in this field. This will no doubt positively affect your deliberations and negotiations in the Conference. The resolution on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, sponsored by more than 157 Member States at the forty-eight session of the General Assembly, and adopted by consensus, is a milestone in the efforts of the international community to ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

"I am gratified that, pursuant to this resolution, and following consultations during the inter-sessional period, the Conference will now

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give priority to negotiations for a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would undoubtedly contribute effectively to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, to the enhancement of international peace and security. It would also contribute greatly towards the successful outcome of the 1995 review and extension conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. I am sure that your Conference will seize the opportunity now before it achieves, as a matter of urgency, this long-sought goal of the international community.

"The Conference will also be giving priority to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. However, unless this goal is realized, it is important for the international community to develop, in addition to the positive guarantees contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), effective measures or arrangements for negative security assurances as an essential element for an effective regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should now take a fresh look at the question of negative security assurances in the light of the recent positive developments in the international scene. It should pursue this issue with renewed vigour.

"Further evidence of the importance attached by the international community to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects was the adoption by the General Assembly of a consensus resolution recommending the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I am aware of the complexity of this issue; I am confident, however, that the Conference will find the most appropriate arrangement to address it.

"Transparency in armaments has now become an important new focus of your endeavours. The establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms is an event of great importance. The potential of the Register as a confidence-building measure through increased openness and transparency in military matters cannot be overemphasized. I am pleased that more than 80 States, including most major arms suppliers and recipient States, have provided information to the Register in its first year of operation, thus making most of the world's trade in major conventional arms transparent. Later this year, a group of experts will be convened to consider the continued operation of the Register and its expansion: this might include the addition of further categories of equipment, and data on military holdings and procurement through national production. This would result in a far-reaching international confidence-building tool

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which could create unprecedented transparency both in the international arms trade and in the national production of arms. It could also culminate in the establishment of an early-warning system which would pave the way for the reduction of conventional armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the principle of the legitimate security needs of States. I therefore urge you to continue to address this issue with determination, with a view to contributing to this goal, and thus to ensuring that disarmament and arms control play a major part in the efforts of the United Nations in the field of preventive diplomacy and peace-making.

"Your Conference has, over the years, done useful work on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The new international political environment suggests that the world community should seize the opportunity to ensure that space technology is effectively used to promote the security of all States. New ideas have been put forward, especially in the field of confidence-building measures. I urge you to explore these avenues further.

"The question of expansion of membership of the Conference has been on your agenda for a number of years. I hope that agreement will soon be reached to ensure that the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body better reflects the current geopolitical situation, and is able to meet the security challenges of the 1990s and the next century. This would also greatly facilitate your ongoing consultations on the review of the agenda of the Conference.

"The tasks ahead of your Conference are daunting. With the determination and commitment that have characterized your action during the last few years, I believe that they can be fulfilled.

"I wish you every success in your endeavours."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for passing on to us the message from Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. I would ask Mr. Petrovsky to be so kind as to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of our appreciation for his contribution and the importance he attaches to our work.

The Secretary-General has also written to me transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session. The letter has been distributed as CD/1236.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Mexico, Sweden, the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I will afterwards give the floor to the Ambassador of Japan, Mr. Tanaka, who will present his report on his consultations. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Before reading a short message from my Government, allow me to extend a very warm welcome to the new Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and our new colleagues from Algeria, Argentina, Ethiopia, Italy and Venezuela. We wish their predecessors every success. We congratulate Mr. Abdelkader Bounmail for his very well-deserved appointment as Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. We are very pleased to have with us today the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, and we wish him every success in his new and important task. We would like to thank Ambassador Mounir Zahran for the efforts he made during the Conference's inter-sessional period and we are very pleased to see you, Ambassador Errera, presiding over this initial stage of our annual session. Last year you helped to resolve various issues which enabled our work to get off to a smooth start and we are sure that something similar will be achieved this year. Indeed, we are sure that you and your delegation will continue to contribute to the search for disarmament measures that will bring about a world that is less armed and more secure for all. Now I wish to read the message from the Government of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament dated 25 January 1994.

"For decades the international community has been advocating the complete cessation of all nuclear testing. Both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly of the United Nations and other multilateral forums, Mexico has insisted upon the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race through the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT).

"In the General Assembly, Mexico has been one of the principal promoters of the 100-odd resolutions adopted on this item. Since the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament in 1962, Mexico has called for prompt agreement on a CTBT. In the light of the difficulties that emerged in the Conference, we explored another path, that of amending the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty.

"After more than 2,000 nuclear tests and 30 years after the adoption of the partial test-ban Treaty, the Government of Mexico rejoices in the Conference on Disarmament's unanimous decision of 10 August last to undertake finally the negotiation of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing. That decision, which today we shall put into practice, was endorsed and strengthened by the General Assembly in its historic resolution 48/70 of 16 December 1993, which reflects the will of the entire international community to proceed quickly and expeditiously in the solution of this question of utmost importance for everyone. The Conference on Disarmament will now have to begin an intensive dialogue with a view to drafting without delay a CTBT whose prompt conclusion will send a political message of great significance. The Government of Mexico commits itself to contributing to the search for a text embracing compromise solutions that, in turn, will ensure that the treaty enjoys the widest possible adherence and that it is internationally and effectively verifiable."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and his kind words addressed to me and my delegation. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, I would like, first of all, to congratulate you upon your assumption of the Chair and to offer your delegation the full support of my delegation. I trust that under your able leadership we will have a good start to this session of the Conference on Disarmament and in particular that we will be able to make rapid progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I also welcome the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Vladimir Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail.

It is with great hope and satisfaction that I take the floor today, as there is now, at last, a consensus within the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Conference will very soon, maybe already today, take a decision to establish an ad hoc committee with a clear mandate to negotiate such a treaty.

Sweden has on several occasions submitted treaty proposals for a multilateral text on a comprehensive test ban. A new draft treaty text, including a verification protocol, has now been presented and circulated in document CD/1232. It was presented by my delegation during informal consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee on 9 December last year. In producing the draft we consulted with many delegations and received many valuable comments, which we have taken into consideration. Today I have the honour to officially introduce the Swedish proposal in the plenary of the Conference.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will mainly serve two purposes, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Through START I and II as well as other agreements and unilateral decisions there is already a clear trend towards nuclear disarmament. A test-ban treaty is therefore primarily directed at non-proliferation. As is stated in the preamble of the proposed treaty text, a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests would be an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As to the scope of the proposed treaty, it includes a total ban on all nuclear explosions, i.e. also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. There is in the view of my delegation no practical use of peaceful nuclear explosions. Such explosions could on the contrary serve as a tool for developing nuclear weapons. When formulating the article on scope (article I), we have been guided by the wording of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which is also referred to in the preamble and which has served well for 30 years. Under the proposed text it is also prohibited to cause, encourage, assist in, permit or prepare nuclear explosions. My delegation is fully aware of the difficulty to define and verify preparations for a nuclear test. This element has, however, been included, as it is in our view logical in this context to include at least direct preparations leading up to a nuclear test.

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In the proposal it is suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, would be the "implementing agency", assigned, inter alia, the task of verification of compliance with the treaty. We have proposed IAEA since it seems reasonable to make use of an existing and viable organization active in the nuclear field, instead of establishing a new one. IAEA has long experience in international verification work and international cooperation involving sophisticated technologies, with particular experience regarding on-site inspection. Of course, new expertise has to be added to the Agency in areas relevant to CTB verification which are new to IAEA, for example in seismology and hydroacoustics. But at the same time it is to be expected that economic benefits stand to be gained from the fact that existing administrative and support resources within the organization could be used.

The verification system is outlined in a protocol to the draft treaty. The protocol is proposed as an integral part of the treaty. The intention is to create an efficient and cost-effective verification system that will give all parties an essentially equal possibility to satisfy their verification needs. The proposed verification system consists of a global monitoring system and on-site inspections. The core of the monitoring system would be a two-tier network of seismological stations, one called the Alpha network, established and operated by the Agency, and one called the Beta network, established and operated by the States parties. The seismic network would be complemented with networks of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere and hydroacoustic signals in the oceans.

From these stations vast flows of data would be received and processed by an international data centre to be established within the Agency. The centre would provide a useful service to the States parties by rapidly distributing the easily accessible results of the analysis for their final assessment. The parties may if they wish ask, through the Agency, for clarifications or further information from another party on whose territory an event has occurred. In cases of uncertainties repeated exchanges of information may take place. If the unclear situation still remains thereafter, a State party may address a request for an on-site inspection to the Director-General of IAEA, who shall bring the matter to the attention of the Board of Governors of the Agency. That body may decide to launch an on-site inspection, the decision to be taken with a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

An on-site inspection upon request, a sort of challenge inspection, is an important feature of the verification system. This is meant to be the ultimate means to verify compliance with the treaty, if uncertainties have not been removed through exchanges of information. Challenge inspections will, in our view, occur only on rare occasions. The rule for a two-thirds majority in the Board of Governors is meant to eliminate the possibilities of abuse. It is of importance to carry out an on-site inspection as soon as possible after the request is made. It is stipulated that the on-site inspection shall begin in no case later than seven days after the decision of the Board of Governors. The inspection team shall report to the Board of Governors. Decisions on the report shall be taken by the Board with a two-thirds majority. In case of non-compliance the Board shall report the findings to the Security Council of

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

the United Nations. It may be noted that if clear breaches of the treaty obligations occur, a State party may lodge a complaint directly with the Security Council.

A large number of high-yield chemical explosions are carried out each year all over the globe, mainly for mining purposes. Appropriate procedures are needed to handle these events so that they do not jeopardize confidence in the treaty. Therefore we propose that chemical explosions with a yield exceeding 500 tons of TNT equivalent shall be notified to the Agency 15 days in advance and that they may be subject to on-site observation by the Agency. Explosions with a yield of between 100 and 500 tons of TNT equivalent shall be notified to the Agency not later than seven days after the explosion. There will also be a possibility to establish declared sites for parties that regularly conduct large explosions, for example in a mine. A declared site shall be open to on-site observation by the Agency, which also may place recording equipment at the site.

Sweden, like many other countries, has actively worked for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty for several decades. The issue has been on the agenda of this Conference and its predecessors since the early 1960s. Until recently an agreement on a nuclear test ban has proved elusive. But times have changed. In the year 1987 47 nuclear tests were carried out. Since September 1992 only one nuclear test has taken place. The present moratoria on nuclear testing are conducive to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and contribute to a favourable atmosphere in the coming negotiations. Therefore, my Government urges all nuclear-weapon States to extend existing moratoria when they expire, and to declare a moratorium if they have not yet done so.

The Conference on Disarmament now has an historic opportunity to abolish nuclear testing for all time. The prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty have never been more favourable. The Swedish treaty proposal is aimed at facilitating the work of the Conference on a nuclear test ban. My delegation hopes that it may serve as a basis for the negotiations.

Let us now seize the opportunity and work energetically and rapidly to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty of unlimited duration equipped with a satisfactory verification system.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Mr. John Holum, Director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. HOLUM (United States of America): Mr. President, on behalf of the United States, may I first wish you every success as you guide the work of this body to begin this important year? You will have the complete cooperation of the United States delegation. I also thank your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his wise and skilful performance of the challenging duties of President. I would also like to congratulate the new Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

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Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and express our confidence that we will have with him the same close and productive relationship that we enjoyed with his predecessor.

This is my first opportunity to address a session of the Conference on Disarmament as the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This forum serves the cause of a safer and more stable world, and my presence here today reflects the commitment of the Clinton Administration to the goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Upon my confirmation in November, the President reiterated to me the high priority he personally gives to making concrete, rapid progress on strengthening international security through multilateral cooperation. The end of the cold war has created particular opportunities for the CD, and I am here today to pledge to you that the United States will do everything in its power to make the most of them. In this regard, I would like to read out to you a message to the Conference from President Clinton:

"I am grateful for the opportunity to address all those who are participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This Conference has several important items on its agenda as the 1994 session begins, including transparency in armaments, and it may assume others, such as a ban on fissile material production for nuclear explosive purposes. None is more important than the negotiation of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear explosions. This challenging, but crucial, objective is the Conference's top priority. It reflects our common desire to take decisive action that will support and supplement the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and will further constrain the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons.

"Regional instabilities, the end of the cold war, and the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons have created new and compelling circumstances to encourage progress in disarmament. Accordingly, I decided last July to extend the moratorium on the United States nuclear-weapons tests and committed the United States to achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the same time, I called on the other nuclear-weapon States to observe a testing moratorium, and I do so again today.

"I am confident that Ambassador Ledogar and the United States delegation will join with you in taking bold steps toward a world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest time of a comprehensive test-ban treaty that will strengthen the security of all nations. You have my best wishes during this important Conference."

- and it is signed by President Bill Clinton of the United States.

The CD is the only multilateral forum to address global arms control and disarmament issues on a continuing basis. Its membership covers every region of the globe and reflects a wide range of concerns and interests. We have all

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come to accept the CD as both a market-place of ideas and a place where nations get down to practical business and conclude the agreements that enhance international security.

The United States recognizes the importance of the CD as a multilateral arms control body, and we have consistently supported appropriate membership expansion. We do, however, insist that it is inappropriate to elevate the status in the CD of a State whose behaviour continues to be flagrantly opposed to the goals of the Organization. It is our hope that CD members will continue working together to forge a consensus on an acceptable membership package.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention vividly demonstrates how the constructive competition of ideas and the pursuit of diverse interests and concerns can produce achievements to benefit the entire international community. I congratulate you on that signal accomplishment. However, this is not the time to rest. There is much work to be done; the demands are immediate; and we have a unique opportunity to help shape the world constructively.

The end of the cold war actually has increased the need for arms control. There are new sources of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. Formerly contained ethnic tensions have emerged in areas where adversaries are all too ready to use violence as the instrument of first resort. Sadly, there is abundant evidence that we still live in a world where technology advances faster than human wisdom. Arms control can help us meet the challenge of bringing peace and stability to a troubled new world order. We can limit and reduce destabilizing military forces. We can prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. We can contribute to confidence and trust through greater transparency about our military activities, and doing these things is not a sign of weakness or of capitulation; it is a wise investment in the future and a sure way to underwrite all of our vital national interests.

Much is under way. Less than three weeks ago, the presidents of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the United States signed a statement that opens the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It provides for the transfer of all nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to Russia for their dismantlement, while recording agreement on compensation for Ukraine, previewing the security assurances that the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom will provide Kiev once it accedes to the NPT and START I enters into force, and reiterating the United States commitment to assist in eliminating strategic systems on Ukrainian territory. This trilateral statement advances the interests of all three countries and of the international community in general. It will accelerate the entry into force and implementation of the strategic arms reduction Treaty, bolster the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and lead to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons. Equally important, this agreement should help establish a

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pattern of stable political relationships. It can contribute to an environment in which democratic reform, economic vitality, and social harmony can be pursued without dangerous distraction.

Arms control and confidence-building efforts are being seriously pursued elsewhere at the regional level - including the working group on arms control and regional security created as part of the Middle East peace process, the new regional forum created by the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the historic progress on arms control and non-proliferation in Latin America, and the agreement in principle between India and Pakistan to establish a multilateral dialogue on regional security and non-proliferation. Similarly, we were encouraged when CSCE ministers decided last December in Rome to begin discussions in the Forum for Security Cooperation of possible arms control contributions for settling the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

Manifestly, the arms control negotiating tables are now located not only in the conference rooms of Washington and Moscow and the committee rooms here in Geneva, but also in Buenos Aires; in New Delhi and Islamabad; in Cairo and Tel Aviv; and in many other places around the globe. While the venues are varied, the objectives are closely linked. The CD has been the proving-ground of new ideas and has set in motion a new dynamic and a new spirit of international negotiations.

With this dynamic in mind, let me turn to some of the major items of business that will occupy you in the days ahead. In the short time I have been here in Geneva, I have already sensed the great anticipation of our forthcoming negotiations of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or CTBT. And we should be excited. A CTBT is long overdue. We are beginning the final steps of a journey of too many years.

Let me be clear at the outset: United States policy - announced by President Clinton on 3 July - is one of strong support for concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time. Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, a CTBT becomes even more important. It will be an important part of our efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and will place a major restraint on the nuclear-weapon States. The United States has been working hard - as have many of you - to ensure a smooth start to the negotiations. We were pleased to be able to co-sponsor the United Nations resolution supporting the objectives of a CTBT. Its acceptance by consensus provides a strong base from which to launch your negotiations. The consensus at the United Nations shows there is now virtually universal support for a CTBT. While the issues are complex, they are not beyond our immediate reach; we should be able to work out the essential elements of a treaty expeditiously. "At the earliest possible time" means just that. Obviously, no country can unilaterally set the pace, and we should avoid arbitrary deadlines, but I assure you that as compared to some past deliberations on this issue, the United States will be out front pulling, rather than in the back dragging our heels.

A CTBT will be fully successful only with the participation and support of the five nuclear-weapon States and with broad international adherence. The nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility to contribute to these

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negotiations, and you have our commitment that the United States will meet its responsibility. For the United States, a tangible demonstration of our commitment to the CTBT is our continuing moratorium on nuclear testing. In his message to you which I read a few minutes ago, the President has again urged the other nuclear-weapon States to refrain from testing.

With the end of the cold war, we have moved from a bipolar world to a multipolar world. The threat of nuclear proliferation remains, and with it the need to preserve the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the primary bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT reflects a broad consensus against nuclear proliferation. The Treaty also establishes a framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and regulating cooperation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And it has proved an important instrument for enhancing the social and economic development of its members.

The United States welcomes the substantial progress made at the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference, including the decision to open its proceedings to observers from both non-party States and non-governmental organizations. The Prepcom reaffirmed the importance of consensus as its method of decision-making, and it agreed on the background documentation the parties will need from the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other organizations to support their work. The Prepcom also unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the presidency of the 1995 conference. The work of the Prepcom is all the more important because of the end to which it is directed. The United States is committed to make every effort to achieve the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. Without a stable and durable non-proliferation regime, which includes a strong NPT, further arms control methods will be jeopardized.

Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 will ensure that the many benefits the NPT provides to its parties will remain available. By indefinite extension, the international community will send to would-be proliferators the clearest possible signal that their activities are not acceptable.

The threat of nuclear proliferation has diminished in some regions, such as Latin America and Africa. We need to ensure that for the future such regional security benefits provided by the NPT are not mortgaged by a decision to limit its extension. The full weight of the NPT membership behind a Treaty of unlimited duration would be a formidable political force for non-proliferation. Moreover, it would provide an essential foundation for building further on the historic measures already taken to limit, reduce, and dismantle nuclear-weapon systems.

Our objective of reshaping the nuclear contours of the post-cold-war security landscape does not end there. The successful implementation of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the implementation of unilateral initiatives, such as reduction and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic arms reduction agreements, including START I and START II, were significant contributions to the process of halting the spread

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of nuclear arms. Now we can add not just the CTBT negotiations and NPT extension, but also negotiations for a global agreement to prohibit further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards, as President Clinton urged in his address to the United Nations last September.

Such an agreement should be formally negotiated here in the CD. We were greatly encouraged by the consensus support at the United Nations for such a convention. A non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable fissile material production ban could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of certain non-NPT States under some measure of restraint for the first time. It would also halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon States.

Negative security assurances are also related to the cause of non-proliferation. We adhere to a policy that has been reiterated by several previous administrations, namely:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining this attack."

As we have stated repeatedly in this forum, the United States is open to discussions on this issue.

We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons; but we can control them. We can limit their impact and their influence. Deep reductions in nuclear-weapons inventories, strengthened and extended non-proliferation norms, conclusion of a CTBT, a global ban on fissile material production, and other measures will alter fundamentally the role of nuclear weapons in the world of the twenty-first century. All these steps will contribute to the important goal we all share - a safer and more stable world.

The devastating destructive power of nuclear weapons and the dangers posed by other weapons of mass destruction demand that they remain high on our arms control agenda, but they cannot be the only items. Another crucial element of the arms control equation is conventional arms.

We are reminded daily that the end of the cold war has not by any means removed all conflict and danger from the world. Regional arms races and destabilizing accumulations of arms well beyond those realistically needed for defence are all too common. Reversing these trends is a global responsibility. We can help reduce the sources of tension that generate such accumulations. We must continue working to discourage the use of arms in resolving disputes.

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The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a landmark in the reduction of conventional weapons. It serves as the foundation for a post-cold-war security architecture in Europe based on cooperation rather than confrontation. We look forward to its full implementation in 1995, and note with satisfaction that tens of thousands of items of equipment have already been destroyed.

The immediate challenge to this forum is to promote greater transparency about security matters. Transparency in turn fosters the greater confidence and trust upon which stable political relationships can rest. Last year the CD created an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments (TIA). As the first new committee established by the CD in a number of years, it demonstrated the CD's ability to adapt to the challenges of the post-cold-war era. It is important as well because it is the only item on your agenda that addresses the conventional arms challenge. I strongly encourage you to build on the very useful work begun in the TIA Ad Hoc Committee last year. I also recommend the ideas put forward last year by the United States to promote transparency regarding conventional arms.

Some object that we should instead pay even more attention to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. Let us discuss those concerns seriously, but let us not create yet another setting where we repeat ourselves endlessly to the point where other important business is neglected. If we slacken in our willingness to address the conventional weapons problems that first gave rise to the TIA initiative, we will not make much progress, and we will begin to slide away from our global conventional arms control objectives. Just as in the nuclear area, the work done here in Geneva on conventional arms will have a significant impact on related efforts elsewhere. We share your pride in the successful initiation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The first year's experience with the Register was good - but not good enough. Eighty-two responses represent answers from less than half the United Nations membership. We must do better; our goal should be universal participation, which your work here at the CD can encourage.

The United States also looks forward to the experts' meeting on these issues in New York next month. We will play an active part in moving their efforts to a successful conclusion.

Another conventional arms issue on which we have taken a first step relates to land-mines. These weapons continue to wreak havoc on civilian populations whether or not they are any longer in an active war zone. The United Nations has supported by consensus the United States-initiated resolution calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. We must now take the next step and make the global moratorium a reality. In doing so, we not only protect the futures of many innocent civilians, but we also draw attention to a range of problems long thought too difficult for arms control to solve.

This process will also be fortified by this year's experts' deliberations leading to a review conference on the Convention on weapons which may be

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deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Although not presently a party to this Convention, the United States will closely follow the progress of the conference as an observer, and the President intends to submit the Convention to the United States Senate this year for advice and consent to ratification.

These positive developments can mutually reinforce one another, forming a tide that can break down resistance to progress on the conventional arms control agenda. The CD should help swell that tide.

In my closing minutes, let me briefly touch on the other developments and other issues that are part of United States arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts.

Despite the fact that the chemical weapons Convention has now passed beyond the CD's purview, I know that you remain keenly interested in its fate. In Washington this past November, President Clinton submitted the Convention to the United States Senate for advice and consent, and will push for ratification early this year. The United States urges every other signatory to do the same, so that the Convention will enter into force for the critical parties at the earliest possible date.

The United States has also been pleased by the progress made by the Preparatory Commission in The Hague on elaborating the complex procedures that will guarantee the Convention's smooth and effective functioning.

The biological and toxin weapons Convention (BWC) has been strengthened since its entry into force by the increased membership and by the confidence-building measures developed by successive review conferences. We believe the world can go further. President Clinton has announced that the United States will promote new measures to increase transparency of activities and facilities that could have biological and toxin weapons applications. The United States also supports the work of the Ad Hoc Group of governmental experts convened to identify and examine potential BWC verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. We support an early conference to consider the report and to discuss the next steps to strengthen the international norm against a scourge that could well become the next weapon of mass destruction of choice.

The Clinton Administration's non-proliferation policy also attempts to find solutions where non-proliferation norms have not taken hold. The United States has taken a strong stand against any North Korean nuclear-weapon ambitions. In coordination with many other countries, we have made it clear to North Korea that, to resolve the nuclear issue, it will have to provide the international community with assurance that it does not possess nuclear weapons and it will not build them in the future. This means that North Korea must remain a full party to the NPT, fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including accepting regular and special inspections, and fully implementing the denuclearization agreement reached by North and

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South Korea. Our position remains unchanged: North Korea will have to meet these obligations aimed at ensuring a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula and a strong international non-proliferation regime.

Proliferation threats are acute in South Asia and the Middle East. The United States is encouraging India and Pakistan to join in a multilateral effort to examine regional security and arms control issues. We continue to support the activities of the working group on arms control and regional security in the Middle East.

The diffusion of missile technology makes the world a more dangerous place for all of us. The United States wants to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime to ensure that it continues to be an effective vehicle to combat missile proliferation.

The Conference on Disarmament is strengthened by its success with the chemical weapons Convention negotiations. It is energized by the prospect of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is challenged by the demands of enhancing transparency in armaments. It is bolstered by important arms control developments beyond these halls.

Our responsibility now is to make the most of the opportunity before us. The task is immediate; but our results will be long-lasting. The challenges are enormous; but they are matched by the promise of profound results. The path will be difficult; but it will be worth every effort when we arrive at our destination. Let us get down to work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Holum for his important statement and the wishes he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to thank both you and your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran, for the very considerable inter-sessional work you both have done to allow this session of the Conference on Disarmament to enter into the substance of its work as soon as possible. I would also like to join you in welcoming the assumption by Vladimir Petrovsky of the post of Secretary-General of the Conference and in welcoming our new colleagues to the Conference.

The CD once again has the opportunity to serve the global non-proliferation effort; this time by means of the negotiation of a universal, non-discriminatory and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. A CTBT will provide an important element to the global security and to the non-proliferation architecture. It is my hope that we will act with the utmost flexibility and pragmatism in order that a CTBT may soon become a reality. It is important, as we search for the parameters of the treaty, to bear in mind the expectation by the global community that we pursue our work expeditiously. We must avoid the temptation to become bogged down in needless procedural wrangles. As the review conference in 1995 for the NPT approaches, we must remember that substantive

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progress towards a CTBT, or better the conclusion of our work, will have an important salutary effect on the prospects for the indefinite extension of that Treaty.

All the nuclear-weapon States have indicated their support for a CTBT and this support was reflected in the resolution adopted by consensus at the forty-eighth General Assembly last fall. Four of the five nuclear-weapon States are currently observing testing moratoria and it is important to our work that all five nuclear-weapon States continue not to test. If a moratorium were adhered to by all five nuclear-weapon States until we successfully conclude a CTBT, the world will have seen its last nuclear test.

I would like to outline the principles which will guide my delegation during the negotiation of a CTBT. First, the Treaty should ban all nuclear explosive testing in all environments for all time. Second, the Treaty should be non-discriminatory and universal, that is, open to signature by all States. Third, the verification regime should be international in character and have a baseline capacity to monitor compliance on a global basis using seismic methods of anomaly detection, reinforced by other systems and technologies, as appropriate. These methods of verification would be supported, as required, by an on-site inspection process. The international seismic monitoring system should receive standardized data from a network of existing and proposed seismic stations. Management and resource responsibilities will require resolution. In this regard, the work of GSE and GSETT-III will support our efforts in a practical and pragmatic fashion. An independent, modestly staffed, international agency should be established to collect, analyse and distribute data and to conduct on-site inspections to determine if a violation of the treaty has occurred. It will be important to bear in mind the requirement that the system be cost-effective. It is our view that the United Nations Security Council could determine the response of the international community as a whole in the event of a confirmed violation of the treaty. As for the structure of our work, I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassador Tanaka which have led to the generally accepted position that we should move quickly to establish two working groups: one on legal and institutional issues and the other on verification.

While the CTBT should remain the focus of our work in this session, as you noted, we also have an opportunity to expand the global non-proliferation effort in yet another fashion and to enhance global security. The United Nations General Assembly also produced a consensus resolution on the "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". That text welcomed the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding the disposition of their fissile material.

The effect of that resolution, however, is to express the wish of the community of nations for a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Despite having been proposed in

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one form or another for many years, this is a relatively new issue for the CD to consider. A period of consultation and reflection is therefore required to ascertain the best way to move ahead.

Finally, I would like to indicate that Canada will shortly be tabling a compendium of CD documentation on the nuclear-test-ban issue as well as a separate volume compiling treaty and draft treaty texts relating to nuclear test bans. Many of you will be familiar with similar compendia we produced for the chemical weapons negotiations and on which I have received many favourable comments. It is our hope that this compendium will prove a useful reference tool for delegations in the coming months as we turn our attention to the negotiation of a CTBT.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference. You do so at an important time in the life of this body. This is particularly fitting given your delegation's unfailing support for the Conference. You will have the full cooperation of the United Kingdom in your efforts. I also congratulate your predecessor on his unusually long and successful stint as our President and I join you in welcoming the new Secretary-General of the Conference, the new Deputy Secretary-General, our new colleagues in the Conference and, last but not least, the new Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to whose maiden speech in this forum we have all just listened with great interest.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban-treaty is an objective long aspired to in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Turning that aspiration into reality has been a long process. It has, along the way, produced the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. But until recently the security environment in which this goal has been pursued has militated against its rapid achievement. That environment has now changed. The United Kingdom Government continues to attach importance to the role of nuclear weapons for the preservation of our security now and in the foreseeable future. But we recognize also that the need to ensure effective measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased. We were therefore happy to join consensus in August last year on the decision to give the Conference's nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee a mandate to negotiate a CTBT. In the light of this consensus, and in the new security environment, the prospect for achieving the aspiration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty must now be very good indeed. The United Kingdom welcomes that prospect, and is committed to working hard for a successful outcome to these negotiations.

For us, a successful outcome will mean the conclusion of a treaty which makes a real contribution to non-proliferation by interposing a substantial obstacle in the process of developing nuclear weapons. I doubt that any among

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us have illusions that a ban on nuclear testing will in itself prevent the manufacture of a rudimentary nuclear weapon. But in limiting the scope of nuclear-weapons development, it will, we believe, play a valuable complementary role in reinforcing the non-proliferation regime.

The crucial instrument of that regime remains the non-proliferation Treaty itself. We continue to believe that there is an overwhelming case for the Treaty's indefinite extension irrespective of what progress we are able to make on a CTBT. If the prospect of a CTBT being in place to complement the NPT's effectiveness serves to increase the confidence some parties have in the ability of the non-proliferation Treaty to stop proliferation - and if this prospect serves to encourage those parties to reaffirm their commitment to the NPT through indefinite extension, we should welcome that. But an opposite relationship is also valid: that the prospect of indefinite extension of the NPT will be an important factor in convincing us that we can confidently move towards the conclusion of a CTBT.

The United Kingdom Government believes there are two elements essential to enable a CTBT to play an effective role in non-proliferation. First, the treaty should have as large a number of parties as possible. The ultimate aim should be universal adherence. Second, it must have an effective credible and efficient verification regime.

How do we set about ensuring that the treaty we conclude provides for these essential elements? On the question of adherence, we must obviously look to the mechanisms we agree for entry into force. One option might be to follow the model of the chemical weapons Convention, with entry into force conditional on ratification by a fixed number of States. But adopting this formula would provide no guarantee of adherence by all - or indeed any - of the countries whose commitment to the treaty we would regard as necessary if it is to play the non-proliferation role we want from it. We would suggest therefore that, at a minimum, all members of the CD should ratify the treaty before it enters into force. Given that we proceed in this forum by consensus, it is surely not unreasonable to expect that a treaty whose terms we have all been prepared to agree should be ratified by all without undue delay. In this regard, in particular, we look forward to the earliest possible progress on enlarging the CD.

For a CTBT genuinely to help our efforts to counter the threat of nuclear proliferation, the United Kingdom believes that an effective verification regime is essential. Such a regime should be able to detect, and therefore deter, at reasonable cost, attempts to evade the provisions of the treaty. We should aim to avoid constructing an excessively costly and over-elaborate verification system, but at the same time we should ensure that the system is sufficiently sensitive and capable to inspire confidence among the parties that there is a strong likelihood that attempts to evade the treaty's provisions can be detected and identified.

The ultimate goal of universal adherence would not be served if would-be parties were not convinced of the verification regime's ability to detect violations of the treaty even where these were of low nuclear yield and when

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attempts had been made to conceal them. But let us remember also that this goal may not be served if potential parties think the cost of the regime unjustifiably high.

It will be an important task of these negotiations to reach a more precise estimate of the likely costs of a verification regime, and to decide how these costs should be apportioned. But I should at this stage like to place on record our belief that all parties should bear some share of the cost of verifying the treaty. We are, after all, agreed that the aim of the treaty should be to provide for the security of all parties.

We believe that the two main elements of a verification regime would be a monitoring system and provision for intrusive on-site inspection. The principal objective of on-site inspection should be to clarify the nature of any suspect event which might be detected - but not necessarily clearly identified - by the monitoring system. The verification regime will require a global network of seismic stations, but seismic monitoring will of course not be the only means of monitoring. The regime should also provide for other methods of detection - bearing in mind that an effective seismic regime could encourage a country determined to evade the treaty's terms to test in environments other than underground. We will, in addition, support the proposition that a greater degree of detective capability may be required in some regions of the world than in others.

Naturally we hope the verification regime will be sufficiently effective to deter violations of the treaty. But where it fails to do so, it will be necessary to ensure that there is provision within the treaty for action to be taken. We believe it will be necessary to include in the treaty an article on measures that could be taken in case of any such violation. We believe that the chemical weapons Convention provides a good starting-point for determining what sanctions should be provided for by the CTBT.

An important question for us to consider will be how to describe in the treaty what it is we shall aim to ban. We believe that a broad formula such as "any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" should be the one we adopt in our treaty. This formula is familiar to all of us as the one used in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. It has been well understood throughout that Treaty's life, and as such offers us a ready-made definition which could serve our treaty equally well. It would, in addition, parallel the language of the non-proliferation treaty, article 1 of which refers to "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

On the question of the duration of a CTBT, we believe that the assumption which guides our negotiating practice should be that we are aiming for a comprehensive test-ban treaty of indefinite duration. This need not mean, however, that we rule out any provision for a review of the treaty after a certain period. Such a review would be able to assess whether the treaty and its verification regime were operating effectively. It would enable us, should it be necessary, to make amendments to that operation. Furthermore,

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the prospect for an indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty will be an important factor conditioning and sustaining our assumption that we are aiming for an indefinite comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

My purpose in this statement has been to look ahead to what we expect to be some of the main issues which will confront us in our work, and to suggest how the United Kingdom intends to approach them. If I have omitted some issues, I have done so for the sake of brevity, and not because I consider them unimportant. But I make no apologies for setting out what to some may seem a demanding set of requisites for our treaty. I have done so because we believe our objective in these negotiations must go well beyond the achievement of a merely symbolic gesture. Our aim is to help produce a credible and effective contribution to non-proliferation, and my delegation is ready to work with energy towards this end.

I should like to make it quite clear that the United Kingdom would regard the rapid conclusion of an effective treaty as an entirely satisfactory outcome to these negotiations. But the rapid conclusion of an ineffective and inadequate treaty would emphatically not be a satisfactory outcome. It is for this reason that we continue to doubt the wisdom of imposing upon ourselves a deadline for the completion of these negotiations.

The United Kingdom has no interest in prolonging negotiations unnecessarily. We must, however, ensure that we do not sacrifice the objective of achieving an effective treaty to that of achieving a quick one. That said, let us work with urgency and vigour towards the conclusion of a credible and effective treaty. For our part, we stand ready to start today.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and his kind words addressed to my delegation. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka, who will introduce his report on the consultations he held during the inter-sessional period concerning the mandate and organization of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, let me, at the outset, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference at the beginning of the 1994 session. I understand that your work is most challenging, but at the same time full of opportunities. My delegation assures you of our full cooperation on your endeavour to discharge your important duties. I would also like to wholeheartedly welcome to the Conference Mr. Petrovsky as the new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and congratulate Mr. Bensmail on his assumption of the office of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference at this important juncture. I welcome our new colleagues who joined us in our endeavours to promote disarmament and international security.

As you know, the Conference on Disarmament, in the decision contained in document CD/1212 of 10 August 1993, requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and

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the organization of, the negotiation. Accordingly, I held six informal open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee, one drafting session, and innumerable bilateral discussions during this period.

I would characterize the consultations regarding the mandate as successful, because the Ad Hoc Committee agreed in its informal consultations on a draft mandate on 13 December 1993. This draft mandate has been distributed to all delegations, as CD/WP.449. In it the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. It also provides for the establishment of at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of the negotiation. I should like to recommend that the Conference on Disarmament adopt this draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

I would like to express my appreciation again to all delegates for their time and efforts as well as their spirit of compromise in the informal open-ended consultations, as I think that it was an important achievement to agree on a mandate, and I am pleased that it stipulates the establishment of two working groups.

Another significant accomplishment during the inter-sessional period was the adoption by consensus in the General Assembly of the resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which was sponsored by 157 countries. In this resolution the General Assembly, inter alia, fully endorses the decision of 10 August of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Also during the inter-sessional consultations I should like to note that a number of documents were introduced which should stimulate discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. Sweden introduced a revised draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CD/1232); Mexico introduced a working paper on behalf of the Group of 21 entitled "Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" (CD/1231); and Australia introduced a draft structural outline for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CD/1235).

Regarding the organizational aspects of the negotiations, my informal paper of 30 November 1993 included five parts, from the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee to the formulation of a rolling text of a CTBT. Different views were expressed on various parts of this paper, especially regarding how and when the working groups should start their work. There was no agreement either on how or when a rolling text should be formulated.

Previously, before the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, I also held consultations on various organizational issues surrounding the negotiation and on the questionnaire, which I prepared at the request of the

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Group of 21 and distributed on 1 September. I reported on the results of my consultations and replies by delegations to the questionnaire on 11 October, at the informal consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee. I also distributed this report as an informal paper of the Chairman at those consultations. It included proposals on the organization of the negotiations regarding frequency of meetings, structure of the Committee, programme of work, participation of experts, the role of the Group of Scientific Experts, the treaty text, as well as a draft mandate for the Committee.

At that stage it was already widely recognized that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban should meet as frequently as necessary, including during the inter-sessional periods. Accordingly, in the resolution of the General Assembly on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, delegations requested the Secretary-General to provide the CD with additional administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations.

Regarding the participation of experts, it was recognized that, while special-purpose expert meetings which address specific issues might contribute to the negotiating process, generally speaking, experts should form part of their delegations. As for the role of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, it is my considered opinion that it is important for them to make every effort towards the early and successful achievement of their Third Technical Test (GSETT-3).

Turning to the question of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1994, based on my early discussions with delegations, I considered it necessary to reach consensus as soon as possible on the next Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. However, despite all the efforts I have devoted to this issue during the inter-sessional period, I have not been able to secure agreement. On the other hand, I understand that this question is being seriously addressed by you, Mr. President, in coordination with the efforts of your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, as part of your consultations on how to start the work of the Conference this year. I sincerely hope that we will soon be able to hear a satisfactory outcome of your consultations.

Finally, I conclude my report by expressing my sincere wish that the new Ad Hoc Committee will soon solve the problems which we have been unable to resolve during the inter-sessional period and conduct the important negotiations successfully.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Tanaka. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all the members of the Conference in offering him our wholehearted thanks for having conducted the consultations entrusted to him which, you will remember, dealt with the question of the mandate and the organization of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. I also thank him for his kind words addressed to me. We have come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I will now give the floor to the Secretary-General of

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the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Petrovsky will be making a statement about the services allocated to the Conference.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The secretariat is mandated by the General Assembly to report to the Conference on the services to be assigned to it during the 1994 session. As in previous sessions, the Conference will be allocated 10 meetings per week with full servicing, and 15 meetings per week with full services during the sessions of the Seismic Group. In other words, we should be able to hold two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1994 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.

As the work of the Conference intensifies, it may be necessary to hold meetings of subsidiary bodies consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice has in the past prevented the waste of allocated resources in the event of early adjournment of meetings. In this respect, punctuality in starting meetings of the Conference is also important. It is also understood that meetings with full services cannot be held in the evening or during weekends.

I also wish to recall that measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning savings in documentation continue to be valid. In order to implement these decisions, all documents need to be presented well in advance and duplication of documentation should be avoided. Moreover, I wish to recollect the statement by the Secretary-General to the Fifth Committee on 26 August 1993, of which you are all aware. In this statement the Secretary-General stressed that in view of the financial situation of the United Nations no efforts are to be spared in exercising restraint on meetings and documentation.

I would also like to remind delegations to submit as soon as possible their letters of accreditation so that we may issue passes granting access to the Conference's rooms. As a result of other high-level meetings taking place in the Palais des Nations, security measures have been strengthened and members will be requested by security personnel to identify themselves. May I suggest that members carry with them either their CD passes or at least the identification provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva?

As regards conference room facilities available for the CD, they will be - in addition to the Council Chamber - room I, the conference room on the sixth floor in the area of the disarmament secretariat, room C-108 and room III on an ad hoc basis, depending on the overall requirements facing the Conference Services Division of the United Nations Office at Geneva. When delegations need such facilities for their consultations, I wish to suggest that they kindly address a request to the Conference Officer, Ms. Pasqualin, who is responsible for assigning such services, in order to avoid any overlapping.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. Does any other member States wish to take the floor? The representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, has the floor.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In relation to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, a subject referred to by virtually all the speakers who have taken the floor this morning, I would like to make a proposal for a decision that might be the subject of informal consultations over the next few days:

(continued English):

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to adopt the report (CD/1214) of the Special Coordinator for membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, presented at the 660th plenary meeting of the Conference on 12 August 1993, and the recommended composition of the Conference on Disarmament attached to it; the report includes as an integral part the statement made by the Special Coordinator on 26 August 1993 at the 663rd plenary meeting."

New members will assume their membership of the Conference at a date to be decided by the Conference. The President of the Conference will continue consultations, taking into account the urgency attached to the membership question, and report to the Conference before 31 March 1994."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his statement. We have all taken note of his proposal. With your permission I intend to take up this matter during the informal session after this plenary. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting, as announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.20 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 666th plenary meeting is resumed.

I should like first of all to deal with consideration of the draft mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This draft mandate appears in document CD/WP.449. May I take it that the Conference decides to adopt this mandate?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now move on to consideration of the draft Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of the 1994 session of the Conference. You are all familiar with this draft, which has been the focus of intensive consultations in the weeks leading up to the opening of the session, and which we have just examined in an informal

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meeting. Since there were no objections during the informal meeting of the Conference on the content of this paper, I will now read it to you.

"1. There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1994 session, the Conference decides, pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of this agenda and without prejudice to their outcome, to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1993 session:

- "1. Nuclear test ban.
- "2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
- "3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
- "4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
- "5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons.
- "6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
- "7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
- "8. Transparency in armaments.
- "9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"2. The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: 'Nuclear test ban', 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space', 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' and 'Transparency in armaments'. For this purpose, the Conference establishes ad hoc committees on these items with the following mandates:

- "- Nuclear test ban (document CD/1238);
- "- Prevention of an arms race in outer space (document CD/1125);
- "- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document CD/1121);
- "- Transparency in armaments (document CD/1150).

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"3. The Conference also decides, in the framework of agenda item 2, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', to appoint, as a first step, a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It further requests the Special Coordinator to report on the progress of his consultations before the end of the first part of the session.

"4. The Conference also recalls its decision to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint two Special Coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and agenda respectively."

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations for the spirit of compromise they have demonstrated, which has enabled us to move forward in our work.

Lastly, I would like to move on to consideration of requests made by States which are not members of the Conference to participate in the work of this session. These requests are contained in document CD/WP.450, which was distributed today, and come from the following States: Austria, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite these States to participate in our work?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Does anyone wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, my delegation was happy to go along with the statement which you have just made on the agenda and organization of work for the 1994 session on the understanding that our acceptance of the appointment of a Special Coordinator to seek the views of members of the Conference on Disarmament on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was without prejudice to a later decision on the forum in which the convention would eventually be negotiated. On the same basis, we were ready to agree that the Special Coordinator should be requested to report on the progress of his consultations before the end of the first part of the session.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Weston for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand for a short statement.

Mr. BISLEY (New Zealand): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair and offering you the full cooperation of my delegation? I also welcome the special representative of the Secretary-General on his appointment as Secretary-General of this Conference and congratulate Mr. Bensmail for his promotion to the rank of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

I would like to state the following on behalf of Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

We regret that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to achieve consensus on the expansion of its membership. We urge the Conference to continue its efforts to come to a solution. As a way forward, we would support an approach whereby the Conference decides now on the recommended composition, but leaves open for the Conference's further decision the date when the new members will assume their membership of the Conference. I wish to stress that, for our part, such an approach is not the solution we would prefer, but rather is an interim measure.

I wish to express the hope that the members of the Conference consider this approach, and try to come to agreement, preferably in the next plenary meeting of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Since we have reached the end of the agenda, I will now adjourn the meeting. I would like to remind you on this occasion that tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 I will be holding the traditional consultations with the group coordinators and China in the sixth floor conference room in the secretariat in order to examine pending organizational questions.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 27 January 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.